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Economic Perspective 2 
A REVIEM OF ALTERNATIVES FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE 
Roger Sandllands, Department of Economics 
University of Strathclyde 
Members of the p resen t Government, 
including Mrs Thatcher, have in the past 
expressed their determination to scrap the 
present system of local r a t e s . This 
determination appeared to be strengthened 
earlier in the year by the political storm 
that blew up over the rates revaluation in 
Scotland. Revaluation in Scotland had 
already been delayed two years beyond the 
normal statutory 5-year period and the 
delay only served to make an even larger 
jump in rateable values inevitable. The 
storm was the greater because the l a s t 
revaluation in England and Wales was in 
1973-
I t i s said that the present rating system 
depends on fairly frequent revaluation if 
d i s to r t ions and inequi t ies are to be 
m i n i m i s e d . To u n d e r s t a n d t h i s 
contention, however, we need to note that 
under th i s system rateable values ar ise 
from two types of source. The f i r s t i s 
s i t e value and the other i s the value of 
the man-made improvements placed on the 
s i t e . Improvements such as new or 
converted buildings, central heating, 
additional bathrooms, and fixed office or 
factory equipment and machinery wil l 
increase the rateable value of properties 
and render the owners liable to increased 
rates. In this sense the present system 
is a tax on development and so discourages 
i t . From the point of view of incentives 
i t would be be t te r i f improvements were 
revalued very in f requen t ly but in 
p r i n c i p l e , and genera l ly in f a c t , 
improvements are reported as they occur 
and new rates assessed accordingly. 
Naturally these imposts are resented by 
r a t e p a y e r s because, apar t from the 
disincentive effects, many improvements, 
especially in domestic properties, do not 
increase the owner's ability to pay. Nor 
are they automatically accompanied by 
increased benefits provided by the local 
authorities: an extra bathroom or garage 
does not mean that the ratepayer has more 
ch i ld ren to be educated or t h a t he 
requires extra police services. 
The other major element of rateable value 
i s the value of the bare s i t e on which 
homes, shops, offices, factories or crops 
may l i e . I l l og ica l ly , s i t e s which, no 
matter how valuable in the market place, 
are l e f t vacant or which are put to 
agr icul tura l use are exempt from rates 
under the present system. In many areas 
the unimproved s i t e value i s the most 
important element in t o t a l property 
values. The most dramatic examples are 
to be found in c i ty centre properties 
where a building may be sold or l e t a t 
many t imes the p r i ce ob ta inab le for 
identical premises in the suburbs or in a 
small country town. For example, in 
Glasgow space in a newly-converted shop on 
the corner of Renfield Street and Gordon 
Street i s being l e t at an annual rent of 
£25 a sq ft (August 1985) while shop rents 
in less desirable areas may be only £1 a 
sq ft. The difference is almost entirely 
accounted for by the s i t e or location 
value rather than by difference in the 
f u r n i s h i n g s , f i t t i n g s or b u i l d i n g 
materials. 
D i f f e r e n t i a l s i t e r en t s (and hence 
differences in potential rateable values) 
can and do change enormously over time to 
reflect changes in the general environment 
and amenities of different locali t ies in a 
city or between one city and other ci t ies , 
towns and v i l lages . The d i f fe ren t ia l s 
wi l l be affected by new motorway l inks , 
the price of petrol, demography, changing 
p a t t e r n s of demand, i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
competition, the closure of a steel mill, 
the opening of an exhibition centre, the 
closure of a school. These are some of 
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the v a r i a b l e s which have exer ted an 
influence, often great, upon relative si te 
values between the valuation years 1978 
and 1985 in Scotland, and even more since 
1973 in England and Wales. In Scotland 
revaluation, together with some changes in 
ra te poundages and r e l i e f s for different 
types of property, has increased the 
average b i l l for domestic ratepayers by 
21%, increased i t by 9% for commercial 
ratepayers and reduced i t by 1W for 
industry. Even greater variations exist 
within each of these categories. 
In this case more frequent revaluations -
say, every two years - would reduce 
anomalies and lessen the size of the 
average change in r a t e a b l e va lues . 
Domestic, commercial and i n d u s t r i a l 
ratepayers whose property values have been 
enhanced by be t te r communications and 
amenities would be asked to pay more; 
those who have suffered a loss of amenity 
or are victims of general trade recession, 
such as the industrial sector in Britain, 
would pay less. Site values are created 
or d e s t r o y e d by t h e communi ty 
independently of the individual efforts of 
landowners. I t i s therefore natural for 
the community, through the state or local 
government, to seek to return these values 
to the community through the ra t ing of 
s i t e va lues . This form of r a t i n g 
commends i t s e l f in terms of the benefit 
principle or the ability-to-pay principle 
or both. 
By i t s e l f the r a t i n g of s i t e values 
encourages intensive development of si tes. 
However, in B r i t a i n t h i s e f f ec t i s 
emasculated by two opposing influences. 
First, more intensive development renders 
the owners liable to a tax on development, 
since i t ra ises rateable value under our 
composite ra t ing system. Secondly, if 
the land i s not used at a l l the owner i s 
exempt from paying any rates, even though 
the unimproved s i te may have an enormous 
market value. Thus a c lear incentive 
exists to avoid development and hold land 
merely for speculative gain. The effect 
of t h i s i s to c r e a t e an a r t i f i c i a l 
shortage of building land and to drive up 
the general level of rents at the expense 
of wages and i n t e r e s t , thus reducing the 
supply of labour and c a p i t a l to the 
economy. 
These two negative aspects of the present 
r a t i n g system could be mi t iga t ed or 
removed a l t o g e t h e r by fol lowing the 
pract ice adopted in several countr ies , 
such as Austral ia , New Zealand, South 
Africa and par ts of the United Sta tes . 
There the rating authorities set separate 
ra tes for land and improvements, with a 
higher ra te for the former and a low or 
even zero ra te on improvements. Idle 
land i s also assessed a t i t s maximum 
permitted use value; that i s , after making 
allowance for any restrictions imposed on 
use by zoning or 'green be l t ' planning 
norms. The practical problems associated 
with assessing the value of s i t e s have 
been shown to be much l e s s than those 
associated with the valuation of man-made 
improvements, as exemplif ied in the 
r e sea rch e x e r c i s e s c a r r i e d out in 
Whitstable in 1963 and 1973 (Wilks, 1974). 
The 1976 Layfield Committee Report on 
Local Government Finance gave only cursory 
a t t e n t i o n to the s i t e value r a t i n g 
a l t e rna t ive on the grounds that the new 
Development Land Tax would take care of 
the taxation of development values and 
tha t ' in these circumstances a local tax 
on s i t e values loses i t s relevance'. As 
we have seen, however, the rating of si te 
values is not a tax on development but, on 
the contrary, i s an a l te rna t ive to such 
taxes. And the Development Gains Tax, 
being a tax on development was found in 
pract ice to be discouraging development 
and so was abolished in the 1985 Budget. 
The logical next step would be to scrap 
i t s sister tax, the element of local rates 
associated with the value of improvements. 
This would leave only the value of the 
s i t e as the proper base for r a t e s , so 
s t i m u l a t i n g i n s t ead of d iscouraging 
development. 
Nevertheless, the distortions arising from 
the infrequency of revaluation, the public 
o u t c r y a t t he sha rp i n c r e a s e s in 
valuations on many domestic and commercial 
p r o p e r t i e s which were caused by the 
delayed revaluation, and the way in which 
the present system deters or penalises 
improvements, have combined to create a 
determination in many political quarters, 
to scrap the present rating system in i t s 
ent i re ty and to seek a completely new 
alternative. 
Among the more prominent a l te rna t ives 
canvassed recently has been the poll tax 
or ' res idents charge1 as the Government 
prefer to label i t . A poll tax could 
involve a tax on the r ight to vote in 
local and nat ional e l e c t i o n s because 
people would be encouraged not to register 
in order to avoid the tax. Alternatively 
i t could encourage people to r e p o r t 
addresses of convenience, dec l a r ing 
themselves res idents in areas where the 
poll tax or res idents charge i s lowest. 
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The 1981 Green Paper Al ternat ives to 
D o n e s t i c R a t e s , noted t h a t i t s 
'administrat ion could well cost a t l eas t 
as much as that of domestic rating, since 
mobile individuals are harder to t race 
than occupiers of fixed property'. 
The main argument advanced in favour of 
the poll tax i s that i t i s fa i re r than a 
property tax in that i t i s paid by a l l 
adults, not only householders. However, 
a l l residents make a contribution, in cash 
or kind, to household expenses and so are 
indirect contributors to the ra tes under 
the present system. If five people live 
in a house while only two people l ive in 
an ident ical house next door the former 
pay lower rates per person but also occupy 
l e s s space. They may toge the r be 
receiving more benefits such as education 
and h e a l t h ( though the l a t t e r i s 
administered and funded by national not 
local government) but will be reducing the 
costs of housing and infras t ructure that 
would otherwise be needed if two-person 
households were the norm. Thus i t i s not 
obviously inequitable or ineff ic ient if 
rates b i l l s are proportional to the value 
of land occupied rather than a fixed per 
capita charge. The l a t t e r i s c lear ly 
regressive while the present rating system 
has been shown by the Layfield Committee 
to be progressive a t leas t through the 
lower income ranges and so does take 
account of ab i l i t y to pay as well as 
benefits received in the form of amenities 
of a l l kinds. 
Another a l t e r n a t i v e , favoured by the 
Liberal-SDP Alliance, i s the local income 
tax (LIT). Various advantages are 
claimed for LIT. I t i s a 'buoyant' tax 
in that i t s yield rises automatically with 
inflation. I t would expand the tax base 
to include a l l income tax payers. I t i s 
re la ted to ab i l i t y to pay. Each local 
authority could set i t s own LIT ra te and 
so promote local accountability. 
However, formidable practical difficulties 
surround i t s operation, even if, as the 
Liberals have proposed, LIT were deducted 
at source at a standard national rate with 
adjustments made at the end of each year 
according to the different local ra tes 
set . If the national ra te were set high 
most taxpayers would claim rebates from 
their local authority at the end of the 
year. This would save employers the 
chore of deducting PAYE at many different 
rates, and also deals with the problem of 
taxing investment income. But Town Halls 
would be deluged by claims for rebates in 
April and there would be great uncertainty 
about the yield of the tax. 
Addresses-of-convenience would again be 
encouraged as people t r i e d to lodge 
themselves in low-tax d i s t r i c t s . Wide 
variat ions between income in different 
areas would ca l l for an equalisation 
scheme on such a scale as to obscure the 
p r i n c i p l e of a c c o u n t a b i l i t y . Most 
damning of a l l in the eyes of the present 
Conservative Government i s that i t would 
on average add 7p in the £1 to income tax 
i f LIT replaced domestic ra tes , and th is 
goes contrary to the Government's search 
for 'incentive taxation' by switching from 
direct to indirect taxes. If the LIT 
were merely supplementing instead of 
replacing the present system there would 
be considerable extra costs (estimated at 
£220m in the 1981 Green Paper) of local 
government. 
Furthermore an income tax is essentially a 
payro l l t ax . Employees w i l l seek 
compensation from employers in the form of 
higher gross wages, or they will withdraw 
from the labour force. Thus the ultimate 
inc idence of the LIT would f a l l on 
employers as higher wage costs and then on 
consumers in higher prices, and on the 
unemployed. 
If with the i n t roduc t ion of LIT the 
present ra tes were scrapped ren ta l s and 
capital values of land and buildings would 
everwhere rise. The major beneficiaries 
would be landlords and exist ing owner-
occupiers who would enjoy windfall capital 
gains. This has been the experience in 
de-rated Enterprise Zones where, as leases 
came up for renewal, rents rose in l ine 
with the reduction in rates. Researchers 
at the University of Cambridge Department 
of Land Economy, in a report earlier this 
year on the effect of business ra tes on 
location of employment, concluded that 
different ra tes have l i t t l e or no effect 
on location decisions. One reason they 
give i s tha t rents vary in l ine with 
ra tes , thus equalising the net price of 
land of s imilar quality (in terms of 
accessibility, amenities, etc) throughout 
the country. 
Many US s t a t e s and Canadian provinces 
ra ise revenues from a local r e t a i l sales 
tax. The advantages claimed for th i s 
sytem are t h a t i t forces more loca l 
residents who consume public services to 
make a c o n t r i b u t i o n ; t h a t i t b r ings 
tou r i s t s and commuters into the net; and 
that as an ad valorem tax i t i s 'buoyant'. 
We have already noted that the present 
rating system has in fact a much wider tax 
base than i s supposed, because a l l 
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household members contribute, in cash or 
kind, to household expenses, including 
rates. Furthermore, we should remember 
t h a t around 60? of l o c a l a u t h o r i t y 
expenditure i s financed from c e n t r a l 
government r a t e support grants which in 
turn are financed ultimately from national 
income taxes and VAT. 
In a small , densely populated country i f 
different local au thor i t i e s impose local 
VAT ra tes there i s l ike ly to be a growth 
of cross-border and mail-order shopping 
which would tend to create a re la t ive ly 
uniform local VAT ra te constantly forced 
to a low l e v e l . If r a t e s remained 
unequal cross-border shopping could make 
the yield very unpredictable and variable. 
Administrative and enforcement costs could 
also be high. This proposal has found 
l i t t l e support from the various public 
e n q u i r i e s t h a t have been s e t up to 
investigate UK local government finance in 
recent years. 
Final ly, we should mention proposals to 
shift the finance of local government even 
more to the c e n t r e than i s the case 
already. This would be accomplished by 
increasing the rate support grant element 
and by removing certain functions such as 
educat ion from l o c a l c o n t r o l . The 
proposal to establish a uniform national 
business rate would tend to have the same 
e f fec t of inc reased c e n t r a l con t ro l 
because i t would increase the need for 
rates equalisation grants. Alternatively 
i t would mean that local authorities would 
adjust the domestic rate to compensate for 
a r i s e or f a l l in the local business ra te 
toward the uniform n a t i o n a l l e v e l . 
Domestic rate poundages would then tend to 
d iverge even more w i d e l y be tween 
au thor i t i es and from the ra te applied to 
commercial properties. This could have 
s ignif icant a l loca t ive and demographic 
implications. So the Government would be 
likely to intervene to equalise rates and 
revenues (through r a t e - capp ing and 
specific, ear-marked grants, for example), 
with a consequent loss of local autonomy 
and accountability. 
I t would appear, therefore, that al l the 
major alternatives to the present rat ing 
system that have figured prominantly in 
recent green and white papers and cabinet 
and p o l i t i c a l party discussions suffer 
from major p rac t i ca l , theore t ica l or 
p o l i t i c a l drawbacks. The s i t e value 
rating alternative has received relatively 
l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n a p a r t from the 
superf ic ia l mention accorded i t in the 
report of the Layfield Committee. Yet 
t h i s a l t e rna t ive does have several clear 
meri ts . I t would re ta in the exist ing 
administrative apparatus and dispense with 
the need for the a d d i t i o n a l army of 
bureaucrats tha t would be required to 
administer a local income tax, poll tax or 
VAT system. The work of valuers would be 
simplified if they only had to value sites 
and could ignore improvements. Site 
valuation is done routinely as part of the 
overall valuation exercise anyway. 
Pilot surveys of i t s practicability in the 
UK have been successfully conducted by the 
Rating and Valuations Association for 
Whitstable in 1963 and 1973. The system 
has existed in several other countries for 
many years wi th apparent success in 
s t i m u l a t i n g more i n t e n s i v e l and 
development. The effect has been to 
bring rated vacant land on to the market 
with a consequent f a l l in ren t s tha t 
allows the level of wages and interest to 
r ise, increasing the supply of labour and 
capital for production. I t also permits 
the a l l e v i a t i o n of t axes on l abour , 
capital and consumers with further benign 
effects on incentives and costs . I t 
p r e s e r v e s l o c a l au tonomy and 
accountabil i ty, though a proportion of 
s i te values can easily be siphoned off by 
national government for the purpose of 
effecting some equalisation among local 
au thor i t i e s with d i f f e r e n t needs and 
resources, as i s done already under the 
e x i s t i n g r a t e support g ran t system. 
Final ly, t h i s reform commends i t s e l f on 
grounds of equity and justice in that i t s 
effect is to restore to the community the 
s i t e va lues t h a t are c rea ted by the 
community while restoring to individuals 
t h e i r r i g h t s to a l l the man-made 
improvemen t s t h a t a r e c rea ted by 
individuals. 
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